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Nakba denial

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This article is about an analysis of the discourse around the Nakba. For the historical debate around the causes of the Palestinian displacement as the central component of the Nakba, see Causes of the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight.

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Nakba denial is a form of historical denialism pertaining to the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight and its accompanying effects, which Palestinians refer to collectively as the "Nakba" (lit. 'catastrophe').[1][2] Underlying assumptions of Nakba denial cited by scholars can include the denial of historically documented violence against Palestinians, the denial of a distinct Palestinian identity, the idea that Palestine was barren land, and the notion that Palestinian dispossession were part of mutual transfers between Arabs and Jews justified by war.[3][4][5]

Some historians say that the denial of the Nakba has become a core component of Zionist narratives,[6][a] and was largely facilitated by early Israeli historiography.[7] Beginning in the 1980s, the New Historians, working from declassified archives, advanced historical accounts which challenged Nakba denial[8] and significant volumes of Israeli Jewish literature have also emerged shedding more light on the period.[9] In 1998, Steve Niva, editor of the Middle East Report, used the term "Nakba denial" in describing how the rise of the early Internet led to competing online narratives of the events of 1948.[10] Zochrot, an Israeli nonprofit organization, has aimed to commemorate the Nakba through direct action.[11]

Nakba denial has been described as still prevalent in both Israeli and US discourse and linked to various tropes associated with anti-Arab racism.[4] In 2011, Israel enacted a law colloquially referred to as the Nakba Law that authorized the withholding of state funds from organizations that commemorate Israel's Independence Day as a day of mourning.[11][12] In May 2023, following the 75th anniversary of the Nakba, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas made the denial of the Nakba or 1948 expulsion a crime punishable by two years in jail.[2]

Background

Palestinians accuse Israel of using "Nakba denial" to absolve itself of responsibility while perpetuating conflict, a characterization which Israel forcibly denies. Zionist historians justify the 1948 expulsion and flight by stating that the invading Arab armies threatened the existence of the new Jewish state with annihilation. However, some of Israel's New Historians contend that Israel's founding prime minister David Ben-Gurion overstated the Arab threat with the goal of expelling Palestinian civilians and taking hold of as much of former Palestine as possible.[13] The term "Nakba denial" was used in 1998 by Steve Niva, editor of the Middle East Report, in describing how the rise of the early Internet led to competing online narratives of the events of 1948.[10]

Palestinian writer and historian Nur Masalha states that Israeli teachers and educators hide the Nakba's horrors from schoolchildren, constructing and upholding a national narrative that excludes Palestinian collective memory. Masalha states that Israel's "schoolteachers, academics, educators, historians and novelists" advance "Zionist knowledge" and Zionist collective memory by using "a campaign of Nakba denial and concealment." And this exclusion, according to Ilan Pappé, "is the main constitutive element in the construction of collective Jewish identity in the state of Israel."[14]

Historical negationism

In Zionist and Israeli statehood narratives

According to scholar Nur Masalha, in Israel there is a politics of denial around the Nakba, embodied by statements by the likes of Golda Meir, such as the famous line "There was no such thing as Palestinians".[15] Masalha states that "denial is central to the Zionist narrative about what happened in 1948",[6] further stating that the politics of denial around the Nakba is itself one of the manifestations of "ongoing Nakba".[16]

Scholar Mariko Mori's analysis of mainstream Israeli historiography of the establishment of nationhood found inadequate mentions of "the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem and the destruction of over 400 Palestinian villages in 1948, thus deliberately denying Palestinian memories of the Nakba."[8] She finds that narratives justifying the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight rest on a number of assumptions, including that Palestine was an "uncultivated", "barren, uninhabited land"; that Palestinian Arabs were part of a "greater Arab nation" and were not a nation, disputing Palestinian Arab nationalism; that Palestinian Arabs were "rioters and pogromists"; that Jews were returning home (the negation of the Diaspora); and that population transfers were a "justifiable, universal solution to minority questions".[5]

In historian Maha Nassar's analysis of Leon Uris' 1958 novel Exodus, Nassar identified the denial of Zionists' responsibility for the 1948 expulsion and flight of Palestinians and the claim that Arabs themselves were to blame (utilizing the anti-Arab racist tropes present in the novel) as constituting a form of historical negationism, that she names "Nakba denialism".[4] The anti-Arab racist tropes include the notion that Palestinians lack religious attachment to Palestine, that they lack "modern feelings of national identity", and are easily induced to violence by their leaders.[4] Within the paradigm of Zionism as settler colonialism, she states that such narratives blame the victims of settler colonial violence for their expulsion.[4]

Historian Michael R. Fischbach defines Nakba denial as a "Nakba counternarrative" with particular roles in Israeli public life and state policy—especially as an instrument of resisting calls for reparations—consisting of the following themes:[3]

  • the "war is war" theme in which the expulsion and flight was an unfortunate but inevitable side effect of Israel defending itself from the invading Arab forces, and that the Provisional government of Israel was not culpable insofar as it did not have a "master plan" of expulsion, while not incorporating subsequent decisions and policies which have ever since prevented refugees' return in weighing the responsibility of the state.
  • the "population exchange" theme in which Jews and Arabs, seen as the wider Arab world, made an irrevocable mutual population and property transfer (e.g. Jews leaving Iraq also left their property behind), and that resettling of Jews in Israel also came at a great cost.
  • the claim that Israel has generally been willing to provide compensation, but that this awaits an international mechanism of some sort, which will apportion the funds, while not incorporating the possibility of individual redress, such as through restitution, in light of Israel passing Absentees' Property Laws and Palestinian negotiators not opposing the international fund idea during the 2000 Camp David Summit (which ended without an agreement); in the case of such "en masse settlement" being implemented, Israel would pay out a sum, and be absolved from any further obligations constituting an "end of claims" clause, closing all legal avenues to individual Palestinians with remaining claims or who do not wish to be a part of the scheme.
  • the belief that the only thing that Israel owes the refugees is property compensation, and not any kind of moral reparations beyond a statement of regret.

Ilan Gur-Ze'ev and Ilan Pappé in 2003 wrote that both Israelis and Palestinians view themselves "as a sole victim while totally negating the victimization" of the other group. On the Palestinians' end, the trend was moving away from "total denial" towards downplaying the "moral significance" of the Holocaust, while on the Israelis' end, "Zionism insists on denying the Nakbah and refuses to admit Israel's role in the Palestinian suffering as victimizer", and that "nothing justifies ... the Israeli denial of major responsibility".[17]

Nadim N. Rouhana and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury in 2017 wrote that the Nakba "was, until the mid-1990s, silenced in the 'official political sphere' of the Palestinians in Israel ... by the Israeli state and its institutional agents". They opined that it is "hard to overestimate the centrality of Nakba denial in Israel", of which "Israel's concern about its own legitimacy was a major factor" in the emphasis of Nakba denial, leading to "the official Israeli state memory [where] Palestine was eliminated from the geography and history of the land" in favour of Jewish/Zionist terms and narratives. They cited the 2011 Nakba Law as "the most illuminating example" of the Israeli state interpreting the growing "consciousness" of Palestinians of the Nakba as a "threat" and thus taking steps to combat it.[18] Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg agree that the 2011 Nakba Law is a form of Nakba denial.[19]

Marouf Hasian, Jr. in 2020 stated that one form of Nakba denial originating from the Global North was that it was "ridiculous" to consider "the birth of Israel" as a catastrophe (Nakba). Hasian highlights one incident in 2009, reported on by Ian Black, where Israeli minister of education Gideon Sa'ar defended the removal of the word "Nakba" from school textbooks. Sa'ar had said: "In no country in the world does an educational curriculum refer to the creation of the country as a 'catastrophe'", and that the "objective of the education system is not to deny the legitimacy of our state, nor promote extremism among Arab-Israelis." Hasian describes that some "Israelis worry that al-Nakba consciousness-raising threatens state legitimacy".[20][21]

In Israeli historiography

According to historian Saleh Abd al-Jawad, Nakba denial has been facilitated by Israeli historiography, as it has "adopted a denial of the Nakba, a negation of the breadth of the ethnic cleansing perpetrated in Palestine".[7]

The 1980s saw a renewed interest among Israeli academics of Nakba historiography, partially resulting from the declassification of Israeli archives on the 1948 war.[b] In the late 1980s, Nakba denial began to be criticized and Israel's history was rewritten by the New Historians, who changed established beliefs regarding the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and Palestinian exodus.[8] Since the 1980s, a considerable body of literature aimed at "demystifying the past" has emerged from within Israeli Jewish society, alongside works, such as historian Ilan Pappé's that have been "unsettling the picture the founding fathers worked so energetically to paint and to institutionalize the hegemonic account of 1948".[9]

Towards the end of the 20th century, the topic of Nakba denial almost went to trial in the context of the discussion of the Tantura massacre and the 1998 thesis by Theodore Katz on it.[22][23] Katz, a postgraduate researcher, was sued by the Alexandroni Brigade, and, in the ensuing legal tussle, half of his legal defense urged him to defend his work and bring forward Palestinian witnesses to speak about the massacre.[22] This defense would have turned the trial "into a case about the denial of the Nakba" according to researcher Samera Esmeir,[22] but the case was instead closed out-of-court.[22]

Ahmad H. Sa'di, social scientist, has described "three modes of denial of moral responsibility for the Nakba"; his work has been cited by sociologist Ronit Lentin regarding three strategies of Nakba denial by Israelis and Zionists.[24][25] These modes, per Sa'di, are: "denying or hiding the historically documented violence", trying to "remove the Palestinians from the history" of Israel before/during 1948, and perpetuating the "myth of 'a land without people for a people without land'"; Sa'di highlights From Time Immemorial, the 1984 work of Joan Peters, and The Case for Israel, the 2003 work of Alan Dershowitz for the latter, when Peters claimed that the refugees were immigrant Arab workers, and Dershowitz advancing similar arguments.[24][25]

The second mode of Nakba denial, with Lentin summarizing Sa'di's views, is acknowledging the Nakba but "denying it carries any moral or practical implications", along with an "exaggerated connection between Palestinians and Nazis"; Sa'di cites the 2003 work of Ilan Gur-Ze'ev where Gur-Ze'ev writes of the "Arab involvement in the Nazi army"; Sa'di interprets this as removing the "victim-perpetrator" dynamic between Palestinians and Israelis by placing them on the same "moral ground".[24][25]

The third mode of Nakba denial, with Lentin summarizing Sa'di's views, is "addressing the moral weight of the Palestinian Nakba unapologetically"; Lentin writes that this is best exemplified by historian Benny Morris' 2004 wish that the 1948 Nakba should have been more complete, with Morris stating: "ethnic cleansing can be justified ... when the alternative is between [committing] ethnic cleansing and [suffering] genocide, the genocide of your own nation, I prefer ethnic cleansing". Sa'di provides another 2004 quote from Morris on this strategy: "final good justifies harsh and cruel acts that are committed in the course of history."[24][25]

In contemporary public discourse

Maha Nassar cites Nakba denial as a feature of American discourse on Palestine.[4] Ahmad H. Sa'di advances the viewpoint that it is the discourse of Jewish supporters of Israel.[26]

With time, the narratives surrounding 1948 have become harder to sustain, and "the first strategy for Zionists", according to Sa'di, was to return to the "old myth" of "a land without a people for a people without a land". Lawyer Alan Dershowitz's 2003 book The Case for Israel exemplifies this,[27] drawing on the 1984 book From Time Immemorial, a pseudo-historical work by journalist Joan Peters that suggested the majority of Palestinian refugees were not native to Palestine, and that with the 1948 Palestine war they returned to their countries.[27] Through this straightforward "denial of the other's existence, this formulation did away with the colonization-uprooting dialectic".[27]

Within Israeli civic society, there are grassroots movements against Nakba denial. The NGO Zochrot aims to raise awareness of the Nakba by directly challenging its denial through direct memorial action,[11] such as by providing tours to depopulated Palestinian villages, sign-posting sites destroyed in the Nakba, and hosting an annual Nakba film festival.[11] In 2007, when Israel marked its independence day, Zochrot organized a parade in Tel Aviv "to mark the recognition of the right of return", stopping off along the way at neighborhoods built on the sites of former Palestinian villages.[11]

Motti Golani and Adel Manna in 2011 discussed the Jewish-Israeli narrative and the Palestinian-Arab narrative of the 1948 war; each narrative "completely ignores" the other narrative; the Palestinians viewed the Nakba "as a formative trauma" when they "to a large degree lost their country", while "the narrative espoused by most Jewish Israelis" was that the "birth of Israel ... must be pure and untainted, because if a person, a state is born in sin, its entire essence is tainted."[28]

Ronit Lentin wrote that the "memory of the Nakba" faced "years of denial and silencing by Israel", but after archives were made available and the New Historians continued their work, by 2010 "many, though definitely not all, Israeli Jews" accept that the Nakba occurred, though "the majority" of Israeli Jews view it as a "necessary evil", which Lentin had in the same writing described as another form of Nakba denial, "addressing the moral weight of the Palestinian Nakba unapologetically".[25] Yehouda Shenhav wrote in 2019 that despite the "partial democratization of Israeli historiography in recent decades, the majority of Israelis still deny the Nakba".[29]

Yifat Gutman and Noam Tirosh, writing in Law and Social Inquiry, conclude that during the 2010s, supporters of Israel and right-wing journalists have popularized the term "Jewish Nakba"—which Gutman and Tirosh say presents a false equivalence between the Nakba and the Jewish exodus from the Muslim world.[30] Academics Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Abigail B. Bakan, writing in The Political Quarterly, say that equivalizing the Nakba with the migration of Mizrahi Jews to Israel constitutes a form of Nakba denial.[31]

Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg in 2018 stated that both "Zionist and Palestinian mainstream national narratives" have been "denying or downplaying the suffering of the other side in order to validate its own claim", resulting in the "simultaneous and forceful negation" of the Nakba and the Holocaust respectively. Bashir and Goldberg assert: "Many, perhaps most Jews in Israel, claim that the Nakba is not an event at all", and follow this with the example of the 2011 publication Nakba-Nonsense by organisation Im Tirtzu, that Bashir and Goldberg describe as claiming that Palestinians do not exist as a people and that only Palestinians and Arab countries are responsible for the consequences borne by Palestinians before, during and after 1948.[32]

Legislation

In Israel

See also: Censorship in Israel and Freedom of speech in Israel

In 2009 the Israeli government banned uses of the term "Nakba" in school textbooks and required the removal of existing textbooks that mentioned it.[33][21] In 2011, Israel passed a law known colloquially as the "Nakba Law" that authorized the withholding of state funds to entities that commemorated "Israel's Independence Day or the day on which the state was established as a day of mourning", or that denied the existence of Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state".[33] While the original bill proposed to make this a crime for individuals, the proposed legislation was amended to financially penalize organizations instead.[34] According to transitional justice researcher Yoav Kapshuk and Political scientist Lisa Strömbom, this law was an attempt to "hamper freedom of expression" surrounding the Nakba, but in doing so it inadvertently "increased public knowledge about the meaning of Nakba".[11] In its wake, columnist Odeh Bisharat wrote that some good came out of the legislation, in that "at least, there's no denial of the Nakba. Nobody claims the whole thing is fairy-tale. The Palestinian narrative has won. The narrative that in '48 a people was exiled, by force, from its land, has seared into Israeli and global consciousness."[11] Yehouda Shenhav wrote in 2019 that the Nakba Law had the opposite of its intended effect, because since the law was adopted, "almost every household in Israel has become acquainted with the Arabic word: al-Nakba."[35]

In Palestine

In May 2023, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree defining the Nakba as a "crime against humanity",[2] and making its denial a criminal offense punishable by up to two years in jail.[2] The legislation echoed developments in Israel, where lawmakers in the hardline 37th government had proposed outlawing the waving of Palestinian flags.[2]

In Germany

In March 2024, amid the Israel–Gaza war, Germany's Social Democratic Party and Christian Democratic Union Party issued a directive for the distribution of leaflets in high schools in Neukölln that dismissed the historical realities of the Nakba as "myth".[36]

The 1960 American film Exodus was based on Leon Uris' 1958 novel.[37]

Notes

  1. ^ Yiftachel 2009, p. 11: "Denial of the nakba, as the Palestinians term their defeat in the 1948 war, the loss of their would-be state and the flight of refugees, has become a core Zionist value."
  2. ^ Al-Hardan 2016, pp. 44–46: "Concurrent with these developments, the renewed intellectual interest in the Nakba in the 1980s also resulted from the Israeli government's partial declassification of archives that pertain to the war on the Palestinians. This spurred an ideologically and methodologically varied group of so-called Israeli 'new historians' and 'sociologists' to reconsider the received Zionist narratives about what happened in Palestine during the Nakba."

Citations

  1. ^ Ben Salem 2021, pp. 1–18.
  2. ^ a b c d e The Times of Israel 2023.
  3. ^ a b Fischbach 2021, pp. 183–200.
  4. ^ a b c d e f Nassar 2023.
  5. ^ a b Mori 2009, pp. 95–97.
  6. ^ a b Masalha 2009, pp. 39, 43.
  7. ^ a b Slyomovics 2007, p. 28.
  8. ^ a b c Mori 2009, p. 89.
  9. ^ a b Sa'di 2007, p. 303.
  10. ^ a b Pappé 1998, pp. 14–23.
  11. ^ a b c d e f g Kapshuk & Strömbom 2021.
  12. ^ Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, p. 39.
  13. ^ Asser 2010.
  14. ^ Masalha 2012.
  15. ^ Masalha 2009, pp. 39, 78.
  16. ^ Masalha 2009, p. 78.
  17. ^ Gur-Ze'ev & Pappé 2003.
  18. ^ Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017.
  19. ^ Bashir & Goldberg 2018.
  20. ^ Hasian 2020.
  21. ^ a b Black 2009.
  22. ^ a b c d Esmeir 2007, pp. 231–232.
  23. ^ Buxbaum 2023.
  24. ^ a b c d Sa'di 2007, pp. 287, 304–309.
  25. ^ a b c d e Lentin 2010, pp. 1–2, 10–11, 90.
  26. ^ Sa'di 2007, p. 387.
  27. ^ a b c Sa'di 2007, pp. 304–305.
  28. ^ Golani & Manna 2011.
  29. ^ Shenhav 2019, p. 48.
  30. ^ Gutman & Tirosh 2021.
  31. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, pp. 511–512.
  32. ^ Bashir & Goldberg 2018, pp. 1–42.
  33. ^ a b Todorova 2013, p. 260.
  34. ^ Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, p. 40.
  35. ^ Shenhav 2019, p. 49.
  36. ^ Ertel 2024.
  37. ^ Nassar, M. (2023). Exodus, Nakba Denialism, and the Mobilization of Anti-Arab Racism. Critical Sociology, 49(6), 1037-1051. https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205221132878

Sources

Books and journals

News media

Further reading

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